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PRIVACY AND INFORMATION SHARING IN THE
WAR ON TERRORISM
PETER P. SWIRE*
I. INTRODUCTION
S INCE the attacks of September 11, 2001, many voices have supported
much greater information sharing to protect national security. The
bipartisan 9/11 Commission Report emphasized this point repeatedly.' For
instance, the Report criticized the lack of information sharing between law
enforcement and intelligence agencies, 2 between immigration databases
and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 3 among first responders4
and between domestic and international collections of information. 5 The
Report called for a major shift in philosophy, from the old "need to know"
approach to a new culture of "need to share." 6 As discussed in this Article,
the need for greater information sharing has been emphasized by Presi-
dent Bush, the Congress and expert groups such as the Markle Founda-
tion Task Force on National Security in the Information Age. 7
This Article accepts the need to share information in a wide variety of
settings. It then asks the next questions-which information should be
shared, with whom and under what circumstances? The central project of
this Article is to create a due diligence list for proposed information shar-
ing projects. For instance, will the information sharing program result in
sharing secrets with our adversaries? Are there novel aspects of the pro-
* C. William O'Neill Professor of Law, Moritz College of Law of the Ohio
State University. I am honored to include this Article in the Villanova Law Review
Symposium in memory of privacy scholar Richard Turkington. Thanks to Bryan
Cunningham and Kim Taipale for comments on an earlier draft. Thanks, as well,
for the comments I received on this project in response to earlier versions of the
current paper, at the University of Minnesota Law School, the University of
Edinburgh Law School, the Oxford Conference on Safety and Security in a
Networked World, the Annual Conference of Data Protection and Privacy
Commissioners, the Battelle Policy Day Conference at the John Glenn Institute,
the International Association of Privacy Professionals Annual Conference and the
Villanova Law Review Symposium. My thanks to Meg Betzel for once again
providing excellent research support.
1. See generally THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES (official govt. ed.
2004).
2. See id. at 78-80.
3. See id. at 80.
4. See id. at 321.
5. See id. at 328.
6. See id. at 417.
7. For further discussion of the evolution of the current information sharing
environment, see infra notes 8-13 and accompanying text.
(951)
1
Swire: Privacy and Information Sharing in the War on Terrorism
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 2006
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
posed system that may have unintended consequences? Are there ways
that the proposed system may actually undermine security?
Part I of the Article describes the support for increased information
sharing that has occurred in the wake of the attacks of September 11,
2001. The Article then examines the "Information Sharing Paradigm,"
which depends on three key premises: (i) the threat has changed; (ii) the
threat is significant, especially due to weapons of mass destruction; and
(iii) progress in information technology offers the most effective response
to the new threat. Taken together, these three premises support greatly
expanded information sharing to fight terrorism. Observers may vary in
the degree to which they believe that the three premises are empirically
true. Examination of the three premises, however, offers a helpful sum-
mary of the context for recent policy debates about information sharing.
Part II of the Article offers a "due diligence checklist" for assessing
proposed programs of information sharing. Table 1 summarizes the
checklist.
TABLE 1: DUE DILIGENCE CHECKLIST FOR A PROPOSED INFORMATION
SHARING PROGRAM
1. Will the proposed sharing tip off adversaries?
2. Does the proposal improve security? Cost-effectively?
3. Is the proposal "security theater"? How much does it provide
only the appearance of security?
4. Are there novel aspects to the proposed surveillance and
sharing? What risks, if any, accompany these novel aspects?
5. Are there relevant lessons from historical instances of abuse?
What checks and balances would mitigate risks of such abuse?
6. Do fairness and anti-discrimination concerns reduce the
desirability of the proposed program?
7. Are there ways that the proposed measure could make the
security problems worse?
8. What are the ramifications internationally and with other
stakeholders?
9. Are there additional, privacy-based harms from the proposed
measure?
10. Will bad publicity undermine the program?
This due diligence checklist highlights concerns about security, pri-
vacy and protection of civil liberties. There is a great urgency to adopt
effective measures to fight terrorism and protect national security. In light
of the urgency to take action, proponents of a new program can err on the
side of optimism. They can conclude too readily that the program will
improve security and have negligible side effects. In response, the due
952 [Vol. 51: p. 951
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diligence checklist can provide important rigor in analyzing new propos-
als. There are characteristic ways that information sharing programs
might go wrong. We should check for those problems before implement-
ing such programs.
II. RECENT SUPPORT FOR MUCH GREATER INFORMATION SHARING
This part of the Article summarizes the support for an enhanced "in-
formation sharing environment" to fight terrorism. By describing the "In-
formation Sharing Paradigm," we can understand the essential logic that
underlies information sharing proposals.
A. The Information Sharing Environment
The Introduction, above, summarized the concerns of the influential
9/11 Commission, which called for greatly enhanced information sharing
in many settings. 8 The Bush administration has embraced the need for
much greater information sharing. President Bush has issued at least half
a dozen executive orders on the subject. 9
Congress has agreed. At the end of 2004, Congress passed the Intelli-
gence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, which notably cre-
ated the position of Director of National Intelligence in order to improve
information sharing among the diverse intelligence agencies.10 Section
1016 of the law, entitled "Information Sharing," calls for the creation of an
"information sharing environment" and mandates staffing and guidelines
for increasing information sharing for anti-terrorist purposes. 1,
8. For a further discussion of the concerns of the 9/11 Commission, see supra
notes 1-6.
9. See, e.g., Further Strengthening the Sharing of Terrorism Information to
Protect Americans, Exec. Order No. 13,388, 70 Fed. Reg. 62,023 (Oct. 25, 2005)
(updating information-sharing directives in light of Intelligence Reform and Ter-
rorism Prevention Act of 2004); Continuance of Certain Federal Advisory Commit-
tees and Amendments to and Revocation of Other Executive Orders, Exec. Order
No. 13,385, 70 Fed. Reg. 57,989, 57,989-90 (Sept. 29, 2005) (updating authorities
of National Infrastructure Advisory Council); Strengthening the Sharing of Terror-
ism Information to Protect Americans, Exec. Order No. 13,356, 69 Fed. Reg.
53,599, 53,599 (Aug. 27, 2004) (directing agencies to give high priority to sharing
of terrorism information); National Counterterrorism Center, Exec. Order No.
13,354, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,589 (Aug. 27, 2004) (creating National Counterterrorism
Center to integrate information from multiple intelligence sources); Strengthened
Management of the Intelligence Community, Exec. Order No. 13,355, 69 Fed.
Reg. 53,593 (Aug. 27, 2004) (calling for improved procedures for information
sharing among intelligence community); Amendment of Executive Orders, and
Other Actions, in Connection With the Transfer of Certain Functions to the Secre-
tary of Homeland Security, Exec. Order No. 13,286, 68 Fed. Reg. 10,619, 10,621-22
(Feb. 28, 2003) (directing National Infrastructure Advisory Council to provide gui-
dance to Secretary of Homeland Security on how to foster information sharing).
10. See Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L.
No. 108-458, § 1011, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004).
11. See id. § 1016.
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The Markle Foundation Task Force on National Security in the Infor-
mation Age has been a key intellectual and policy supporter of greater
information sharing. The Task Force has included a diverse set of former
government officials, national security experts, technology experts and
representatives of public interest groups. The Task Force issued major
reports in 2002 and 2003.12 These reports contain perhaps the most de-
tailed and rigorous explanation of the need for greater information shar-
ing, and how to do so consistent with other important values, such as
privacy and civil liberties. Based on what I learned during my own partici-
pation in the latter stages of the Task Force's work, these reports were a
significant factor in promoting the "information sharing environment"
contained in the intelligence reform legislation of 2004.1'
B. The Information Sharing Paradigm
In order to assess this shift toward information sharing, it is helpful to
be explicit about its intellectual rationale. Commentators have widely dis-
cussed the "Bush Doctrine" for fighting terrorism, which prominently in-
cludes acting preemptively before an attack rather than responding after
an attack occurs. The Bush administration justified the war in Iraq, for
instance, under this doctrine of preemption. 14 The doctrine of military
preemption has been accompanied by a shift toward prevention in the
activities of law enforcement agencies, as shown in a 2002 report by the
12. See MARKLE FOUND., SECOND REPORT OF THE MARKLE FOUNDATION TASK
FORCE, CREATING A TRUSTED INFORMATION NETWORK FOR HOMELAND SECURITY
(2003), http://www.markle.org/downloadableassets/nstfreport2-full-report.
pdf; MARKLE FOUND., A REPORT OF THE MARKLE FOUNDATION TASK FORCE, PROTECT-
ING AMERICA'S FREEDOM IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2002), http://www.markle.org/
downloadable.assets/nstf full.pdf.
13. I became an "Associate" to the Markle Task Force early in 2005, and with
Jeff Jonas, have been the lead author for MARKLE FOUND., IMPLEMENTING A
TRUSTED INFORMATION SHARING ENVIRONMENT: USING IMMUTABLE AUDIT LOGS TO
INCREASE SECURITY, TRUST, AND ACCOUNTABILITY (Feb. 2006), http://www.markle.
org/downloadableassets/nstfIAL_020906.pdf. The views in the current Article,
on privacy and information sharing, are clearly mine and not those of the Task
Force. My writing here complements the work of the Task Force, and offers an
intellectual framework for assessing whether and in what circumstances informa-
tion sharing has net benefits.
14. The Administration's doctrine of preemption was set forth in THE PRESI-
DENT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 6 (2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf, and was up-
dated in THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 23 (2006), http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/
nss/2006/nss2006.pdf ("The place of preemption in our national security strategy
remains the same."). For one critique of the doctrine of preemption, see MARY
ELLEN O'CONNELL, AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L LAW TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM. THE MYTH
OF PREEMPTIVE SELF DEFENSE (2002), http://www.asil.org/taskforce/oconnell.pdf
(criticizing preemptive self-defense doctrine as violation of international law).
954 [Vol. 51: p. 951
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Department ofJustice: Shifting From Prosecution to Prevention, Redesigning the
Justice Department to Prevent Future Acts of Terrorism.15
In this Article, I describe the rationale for what I call the "Information
Sharing Paradigm." Later in the Article, I suggest possible critiques of this
paradigm, but there is an appealing logic to the approach that should be
understood even by those inclined to critique it. In order to preempt and
prevent harm, greater information sharing is justified based on three pro-
positions: the threat has changed; the threat is significant; and progress in
information technology offers the most effective response to the new
threat.
Proposition One is: the threat has changed. During the Cold War the
biggest national security threats were a missile attack from the Soviet
Union or a tank attack across Central Europe. These threats were large-
scale and "symmetric," in the sense that the threat to the U.S. came from
another nation state, using nuclear and conventional weapons that the
U.S. also deployed. Today, by contrast, the threat is asymmetric. The risks
come from a few individuals armed with box cutters (such as the 9/11
hijackers) or homemade explosives.
Proposition Two is: the threat is significant. Weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMDs) are the central concern.1 6 If the only risk were of occasional
and small-scale attacks, harming up to a few dozen people at a time, then
drastic new surveillance and other measures would likely not be justified.
Preventing even a single nuclear attack, however, would be worth an enor-
mous effort.
Proposition Three is: progress in information technology offers the
most effective response to the new threat. Suppose you were an official in
the Department of Homeland Security trying to decide on the mix of new
physical security measures and information technology measures. You
would be aware that the price of sensors, computer storage and informa-
tion sharing networks has dropped sharply in recent years. You would
know that the private sector is developing many new techniques for col-
lecting and processing data and making decisions based on that data.
Consequently, you would likely conclude that the efficient mix of security
measures would have a large and ongoing shift toward information-inten-
sive strategies.
15. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FACT SHEET: SHIFTING FROM PROSECUTION TO PRE-
VENTION, REDESIGNING THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT TO PREVENT FUTURE ACTS OF TER-
RORISM (2002), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2002/05/
fbireorganizationfactsheet.pdf.
16. See Transcript: Rumsfeld Cites Nexus of Terror and Weapons of Mass Destruction,
FED'N OF AM. SCIENTISTS NEWS (Feb. 4, 2002), http://www.fas.org/news/usa/
2002/020402dod.html ("Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that potential
acquisition of weapons of mass destruction by terrorist groups constitutes the chief
security threat facing the United States and the world today."). Judge Richard
Posner recently defended much greater surveillance within the United States,
based principally on the risks from weapons of mass destruction. See Richard A.
Posner, Wire Trap, THE NEW REP., Feb. 6, 2006, at 15-16.
2006]
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In short, the Information Sharing Paradigm rests on three simple pro-
positions: the threat has changed; the threat is significant; and progress in
information technology offers the most effective response to the new
threat. I believe there is a powerful logic to the three propositions, and
potential critics of information sharing should ponder the three proposi-
tions before opposing new initiatives.
C. Assessing the Information Sharing Paradigm
A full assessment of the three propositions is beyond the scope of this
Article (or this author's expertise). To the extent all three propositions
are valid, the case for information sharing is strengthened. To the extent
any of them is less valid, then the urgency of information sharing will tend
to be less.
1. Proposition One: The Threat Has Changed
I believe there is a strong case for Proposition One, that the threat has
changed. The greatest Cold War threats to the United States were from
large nation-states such as the Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact allies and the
People's Republic of China. The U.S. armed forces were deployed in West
Germany, where "we faced the threat of Warsaw Pact forces charging
through the Fulda Gap and driving for the English Channel.' 7 The other
greatest threat was that of nuclear attack, with the Soviet Union deploying
a large number of inter-continental ballistic missiles.
The United States developed sophisticated intelligence tailored to the
Cold War threats. Notably, the United States deployed aerial reconnais-
sance, first by high-altitude U2 airplanes and later by satellites.18 This ae-
rial reconnaissance worked relatively well against large and fixed targets,
such as military bases in Eastern Europe and missile sites within the Soviet
Union. The United States also developed human and signals intelligence
that was targeted at agents of the Soviet Union and other foreign powers.
The Central Intelligence Agency and National Security Agency took the
lead on gathering intelligence abroad. Collection of foreign intelligence
surveillance within the United States was eventually codified in the For-
eign Intelligence Surveillance Act.' 9
17. See William J. Perry, Message of the Secretary of Defense: The Dangers of the Post-
Cold War World, 1996 ANN. DEF. REP., available at http://www.defenselink.mil/exec-
sec/adr96/message.html.
18. See Leonard David, Secret Cold War Spy Satellite Program Declassified by
U.S. (Sept. 15, 2005), http://www.space.com/news/050915-nro-spysat.html (stat-
ing that U.S. satellites gathered electronic intelligence from Soviet naval ships
from 1962-71); U2 Spy Plane, http://www.bergen.org/AAST/Projects/ColdWar/
Arms/u2.html (last visited May 10, 2006) (explaining that United States re-
sponded to Soviet display of bomber planes by designing U2 spy plane).
19. For a history of foreign intelligence surveillance within the United States,
see Peter P. Swire, The System of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Law, 72 GEO. WASH.
L. REv. 1306 (2004).
[Vol. 51: p. 951
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One important feature of the Cold War was that enemy mobilization
was often graduated and visible. There were occasional periods of high
alert, such as during the Cuban missile crisis and several crises in the Mid-
dle East. Most of the time, however, the Soviet military was not on a state
of high alert. In retrospect, the graduated and visible nature of enemy
mobilization is a positive feature that seems lost to us today.
Today, by contrast, the major threats are asymmetrical. U.S. military
spending roughly equals that of the rest of the world combined, 20 and
there appears to be little reason to believe that any other country will soon
challenge the United States militarily with conventional weapons.
In a period of asymmetrical threats, attacks are far less likely to occur
after a graduated and visible mobilization. For those charged with home-
land security, each day may be the day before the big attack. This perspec-
tive lends a sense of urgency to any measure that can reduce the risk of
that attack-action must be taken immediately, or else it may be too late.
In particular, those charged with homeland security have a strong desire
to get information immediately, to help prevent the attack that might
come at any moment. This desire to get information translates directly
into the greater prominence of information sharing as a policy goal.
2. Proposition Two: The Threat Is Significant
Consider, for a moment, the possibility that the United States faces
asymmetric threats but only of a low magnitude. Under this scenario,
widespread new surveillance and information sharing programs would not
be justified.
Public debates since 9/11, however, have generally assumed that "eve-
rything has changed" since the attacks of 2001. President Bush, in his ad-
dress to Congress nine days after the attacks, called for expanded
surveillance powers and said: "Americans have known surprise attack-but
never before on thousands of civilians. All of this was brought upon us in
a single day-and night fell on a different world, a world where freedom
itself is under attack."21
It is beyond the scope of this Article to do an assessment of the actual
risk from each type of possible nuclear, chemical, biological or other at-
tack. I have written elsewhere about reasons to doubt that "everything has
changed" after 9/11 or that the United States today faces greater threats
20. See Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, U.S. Military Spend-
ing vs. the World, http://www.armscontrolcenter.org/archives/002244.php (last
visited May 10, 2006) (showing that United States spent $522 billion in 2005, while
rest of world spent $561 billion combined for same time period).
21. President George W. Bush, Address to ajoint Session of Congress and the
American People (Sept. 20, 2001), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/
2001/09/20010920-8.html.
2006] 957
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than in other periods.2 2 Greater research over time may show that an-
thrax and some other WMD attacks are considerably harder to stage than
many have assumed.2 3 With that said, the widely-held view thus far in the
United States is that WMDs do pose very substantial threats, and the analy-
sis of information sharing programs proceeds on that assumption. If, over
time, the threat from WMDs appears lower, then there would be less justi-
fication for new information collection and sharing programs.
3. Proposition Three: Progress in Information Technology Offers the Most
Effective Response to the New Threat
Beyond doubt, the U.S. intelligence agencies and the rest of the U.S.
government should upgrade their information technology infrastructure.
Information technology continues to evolve rapidly, and there is no ex-
cuse for using old and outdated computer systems and networks. Just as
the private sector continually updates its information technology (IT) sys-
tems, so should the public sector.
As the price of information technology falls, and its performance in-
creases, it also makes sense to shift from physical-based security to infor-
mation-based security in a variety of settings. To take a simple example,
the cost of human guards to patrol the perimeter of a facility stays roughly
constant over time. Meanwhile, the cost has been going down sharply for
surveillance cameras and the network to link those cameras back to a con-
trol room. As the relative cost of information-based defense declines, us-
ing information-based solutions more often is rational.
An additional reason for the United States to rely on information
technology is to maintain and develop a comparative advantage in that
sector. It will be relatively difficult for adversaries to develop counter-mea-
sures for advanced information technology. Research and development
for homeland security and national security may produce commercial
spin-offs, and intensive use of information technology will help ensure that
the U.S. does not become vulnerable to information warfare attacks.
These reasons support a large and continuing investment in informa-
tion technology for homeland and national security. They do not indi-
cate, however, precisely which information collection and sharing
measures are desirable. The next section of this Article creates a "due
diligence" list for assessing those questions.
22. See Swire, supra note 19, at 1342-50 (presenting counterarguments to no-
tion that threats to United States since 9/11 justify increased authority for
surveillance).
23. According to Harvard expert Dr. Richard Zane: "How easy is it to spread
anthrax? It is extremely difficult." Interview by Aetna InteliHealth with Dr. Rich-
ard Zane, Chairman of the Disaster Committee, Brigham and Women's Hospital
(Oct. 10, 2001), http://www.intelihealth.com/IH/ihtIH/WS1I4WO00/333/24524/
336414.html?d=dmtICNNews.
[Vol. 51: p. 951
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III. A DUE DILIGENCE CHECKLIST FOR INFORMATION SHARING PROPOSALS
This part of the Article sets forth ten due diligence questions for as-
sessing proposed information sharing programs. The emphasis in these
questions is on the downsides of information sharing; proponents of a pro-
gram will often be optimistic about what it can achieve, and the due dili-
gence process (in corporate takeovers or for information sharing) is
designed to highlight possible problems that may need to be addressed.
A. No Presumption of Information Sharing Where It May
Tip Off an Adversary
In deciding whether to share information with allies (everyone who is
considered friendly), a key question is the extent to which that action may
also share information with adversaries. To take a simple example, con-
sider the question of how broadly to share the names of individuals who
are on a watch list. Greater information sharing clearly helps to the extent
that many border guards and other allies may use the list to catch the
suspects. On the other hand, sharing information with many border
guards increases the possibility that suspects will be tipped off that they are
on the list, and thereby elude capture.
The first step in due diligence, then, is to analyze the incremental
benefit of information sharing with allies compared with the incremental
risk that the sharing will benefit one's adversaries. This Article will briefly
describe recent research on that topic, and then apply the research to the
topic of information sharing for intelligence purposes in the war against
terrorism.
1. The Security Disclosure Model
Much of my recent research has analyzed the implications of what I
call the "Security Disclosure Model," which addresses the topic of when
disclosure helps or hurts security. 2 4 The model has direct implications for
information sharing, which is disclosure that is designed to go only to
one's allies.
The Security Disclosure Model begins with a paradox. Most experts
in computer and network security are familiar with the slogan, "there is no
24. The basic approach is set forth in Peter P. Swire, A Model for When Disclo-
sure Helps Security: What Is Different About Computer and Network Security?, 3 J. ON
TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 163 (2004) [hereinafter Swire, Security Model], availa-
ble at http://ssrn.com/abstract=531782. A slightly updated version of the material
was published as Peter P. Swire, A Model for When Disclosure Helps Security: What Is
Different About Computer and Network Security?, reprinted in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS
OF CYBERSECUiTY 29 (Mark F. Grady & Francesco Parisi eds., 2005). A second
article analyzed the incentives facing key actors making the decision of whether to
disclose. See Peter P. Swire, A Theory of Disclosure for Security and Competitive Reasons:
Open Source, Proprietary Software, and Government Systems, 42 Hous. L. REv. 1333
(2006), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract842228.
20061
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security through obscurity." 25 For proponents of Open Source software,
revealing the details of the system will actually tend to improve security,
notably due to peer review. On this view, trying to hide the details of the
system will tend to harm security because attackers will learn about vulner-
abilities, but defenders will not know where to patch the vulnerabilities. In
sharp contrast, a famous World War II slogan warns, "loose lips sink
ships."26 Most experts in the military and intelligence areas believe that
secrecy is a critical tool for maintaining security. The paradox is that both
views-that disclosure helps security and hurts security-cannot simulta-
neously be correct. The task of the Security Disclosure Model is to explain
the conditions for when each view, the Open Source view and the military
view, is correct.
The first step toward resolving the paradox is to examine the effects
of disclosures on attackers and defenders. Where disclosure on balance
helps the attackers, then those defending the systems should rationally
keep secrets. Where disclosure on balance helps the defenders, then dis-
closure should result.
By focusing on "effects on attackers" and "effects on defenders," the
Security Disclosure Model highlights the conditions under which the
Open Source and military views are each correct. For Open Source, the
usual assumption is that disclosure will not help attackers much or at all.
In a world of rapid communications among attackers where exploits are
spread on the Internet, a vulnerability known to one attacker is rapidly
learned by others. For Open Source, the next assumption is that disclo-
sure of a flaw will prompt other programmers to improve the design of
defenses. In addition, disclosure will prompt many third parties-all of
those using the software or the system-to install patches or otherwise pro-
tect themselves against the newly announced vulnerability. In sum, disclo-
sure does not help attackers much but is highly valuable to the defenders
who create new code and install it.
In contrast, the military assumptions highlight the ways that disclo-
sure can assist the attackers. For a military base, for instance, the precise
location of machine guns and other defenses is a closely guarded secret. A
major goal is to hide the defenses until it is too late for attackers, so that
they fall into traps. In terms of disclosure helping defenders, the military
traditionally uses its chain of command to tell fellow defenders what they
need to know. There is no general broadcast of security flaws because
such a broadcast would help the attackers but provide little or no informa-
tion to fellow defenders.
That brings us to the topic of the current Article, the intermediate
case that the Security Disclosure Model calls "information sharing." The
Model treats information sharing as indeterminate-there is no presump-
tion either in favor of or against information sharing. To the extent the
25. See Swire, Security Mode4 supra note 24, at 165 n.2.
26. See id. at 165 n.4.
[Vol. 51: p. 951
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information is shared with allies-the "good guys"-then there can be
strong assistance to the defenders because they might catch the terrorists
before the attack occurs. To the extent the information is shared with
adversaries-the "bad guys"-then information sharing can be the tip-off
that lets the attackers escape or change their plans. This dual effect of
information sharing-to help defenders and attackers-is a helpful way to
understand why information sharing has been so important and yet so
difficult a topic since the attacks of September 11, 2001.
Briefly, a fourth possibility under the Model is where additional dis-
closure about a vulnerability will have only small effects on attackers and
defenders. This possibility is called the public domain.
Table 2 pulls the four scenarios together. Notably, the Open Source
scenario shows reasons for openness, with disclosure having a large help-
the-defenders effect and a low help-the-attackers effect. The military sce-
nario shows the opposite, with disclosure harming the defenders and help-
ing the attackers. For information sharing, disclosure helps both attackers
and defenders, making it unclear when to disclose. For the public do-
main, additional disclosure has minor effects.
TABLE 2
HELP-THE-ATTACKERS EFFECT
HELP-THE-
DEFENDERS Low High
EFFECT
High Open Information SharingSource
Public
Low Domain Military/Intelligence
Greater Disclosure Up and to the Left
Greater Secrecy Down and to the Right
2. Applying the Security Disclosure Model
My previous writing goes into considerable detail about when disclo-
sure is most and least likely to aid security. A few highlights are important
to the discussion of information sharing.
Some categories of activity have especially strong reasons for secrecy.
First, even the strongest Open Source advocates understand the impor-
tance of keeping passwords and cryptographic keys secret. Handing out
these secrets directly helps attackers but does not assist defenders. Shar-
ing of passwords and keys should occur only on a need-to-know basis.
2006]
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Second, there is a compelling logic to the longstanding principle of
keeping sources and methods secret. It will often be difficult for attackers
to learn about the sources and methods except from the defenders. Pro-
ponents of information sharing should thus be cautious about sharing the
name of a source, such as the identity of an intelligence agent, or sharing
methods that enemies have difficulty detecting, such as a new form of sur-
veillance that provides useful information.
Third, and more generally, there are strong reasons for secrecy about
surveillance activities. By their nature, surveillance activities are difficult
for outsiders to detect. The outsiders thus do not typically learn much
about surveillance over time. Widespread information sharing about sur-
veillance activities thus can undermine security, because sharing increases
the likelihood that surveillance targets will adopt counter-measures. With
that said, however, the security advantages of secrecy about surveillance
should always be accompanied by assessment of the many other reasons
for oversight and other accountability in connection with surveillance, in
order to uphold crucial values including privacy, free speech and civil
liberties.
By contrast, there are sometimes scenarios where disclosure directly
assists security. One scenario involves deterrence, where disclosure about
the defense is intended to discourage attacks. Another scenario is where
attackers already know about a vulnerability, but action is needed by de-
fenders to increase protection. For instance, terrorists may know about
vulnerabilities in a city's water supply or other infrastructure. In such cir-
cumstances, there is likely to be a benefit from information sharing, be-
cause the city may defend itself better but the attackers learn nothing new.
Along with these categories that tend to support secrecy or disclosure,
there is a pervasive question of how well "selective disclosure" will succeed.
In an ideal world, information could be shared with a large number of
"good guys" but there would be no leaks to the "bad guys." In practice,
leaks are more likely the more people who know a secret. For example,
consider the risk of a leak as information goes from compartmentalized
within one federal agency, to available throughout the agency, to available
across multiple federal agencies, to available to cleared individuals in
states and localities, to available to all first responders.
One response to the risk of leaks is to perform more, and more thor-
ough, background checks. This strategy is likely to make sense for infor-
mation that is accessed by only a select few. It is difficult to imagine,
however, that any background check process will succeed in keeping infor-
mation secret if the secret goes to all first responders in the United States.
The likelihood is simply too great that there will be one "bad guy" who
gets through the background check, or who is compromised after comple-
tion of the background check.
Relying on selective disclosure and background checks faces another
problem beyond the sheer number of people who know a secret. In some
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situations, the most knowledgeable people are those with the closest rela-
tionship to a region or situation. Their local knowledge makes them
uniquely useful but also uniquely risky from the perspective of a back-
ground check. For instance, consider an immigrant and native speaker
from a region that is now in conflict. The language skills and cultural
insights may be essential to understanding a wiretap or other intelligence.
Yet the immigrant may have family or friends aligned with opposition
groups, making it difficult to complete a clean background check.
To summarize the implications of the Security Disclosure Model, it is
vitally important to assess the likely benefits of sharing with allies com-
pared with the risks that the information will be shared with adversaries.
The Model highlights situations where the net benefits of sharing are
likely to be especially high or low, but a judgment about the net benefits
depends in practice on empirical assessment of a number of factors. As
the Markle reports indicate, there are many risks that come from not shar-
ing information. At a fundamental level, however, due diligence is
needed. There should be no presumption of sharing or not sharing data.
B. Ends/Means Rationality: Does the Proposed Measure Improve Security?
Cost-Effectively ?
The Security Disclosure Model focuses on the possibility that informa-
tion sharing will help adversaries. The other most general part of due
diligence is to assess the extent to which the proposed measure actually
does what it is supposed to do. Are the means (the proposed program)
likely to achieve the ends (increasing security)? Does the proposed pro-
gram increase security in a cost-effective way, in light of the other ways we
might spend our resources?
The obvious methodology for this task is to apply cost/benefit analysis
("CBA") to proposed information sharing programs. For the past three
decades, both Republican and Democratic administrations have applied a
CBA to major regulations, including proposed environmental and safety
measures.27 The basic idea is that scarce resources in the public and pri-
vate sectors should only be spent in areas where there are likely to be net
benefits to society. As experience with CBA has grown, the process has
specifically acknowledged the role for qualitative assessment in addition to
purely quantitative estimates of risks and benefits. 28 The most important
27. Presidents Reagan and Clinton required administrative agencies to per-
form CBA on regulations. See Regulatory Planning and Review, Exec. Order No.
12,866, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993) (mandating that agencies choose reg-
ulatory options that "maximize net benefits"); Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed.
Reg. 13,193 (Feb. 17, 1981) (requiring CBA be performed on regulations). For
one discussion of the history and theory, see Robert W. Hahn & Cass R. Sunstein,
A New Executive Order for Improving Federal Regulation? Deeper and Wide Cost-Benefit
Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. Rv. 1489 (2002).
28. See Regulatory Planning and Review, Exec. Order 12,866, 58 Fed. Reg.
51,735, 51,735 (Sept. 30, 1993).
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step, in my view, is to insist on a logical, qualitative statement of how the
proposed program is intended to operate and why that is likely to lead to a
desirable outcome.2 9
The topic of data mining can illustrate this sort of qualitative analysis.
The credit card industry has a well-known and generally successful model
of data mining. When a credit card is used for an "out of pattern"
purchase, authorization for the charge may be declined or the cardholder
may receive a phone call to confirm that the charge is made by the legiti-
mate cardholder. This sort of data mining is widely credited with reducing
credit card fraud.
30
That does not mean, however, that all data mining will be similarly
successful. The credit card system has several attributes that contribute to
successful data mining: (1) a very large number of valid actions (non-
fraudulent purchases); (2) a large number of bad actions (fraudulent
purchases); (3) repeated types of attacks that have a pattern (thieves have
common patterns of using a newly-stolen card); and (4) the low cost of
false positives. "False positives" here refer to valid purchases for which the
system issues an alert. The cost of false positives for credit cards is reasona-
bly low in part because the valid cardholder receives a simple phone call to
determine whether a purchase is valid. Even if a purchase is refused to the
valid cardholder, that person may be able to purchase the item with a
different card, may speak with the card company and provide proof of
identity or at worst can often purchase the item once the problem is
fixed.3 1
Data mining to stop terrorism is quite different than data mining in
the credit card system. In contrast to having large numbers of fraudulent
purchases every day, the number of terrorist attacks is extremely low. In
contrast to having repeated purchasing patterns of credit card thieves,
each terrorist attack may be first-of-a-kind (the first airplane attack into an
office building, the first shoes set on fire, etc.). In addition, the cost of
false positives is likely to be much higher, in at least two respects. First, the
effect on someone falsely labeled a "terrorist" can be very high-imprison-
ment, failure to pass a background check and so on. Second, the cost to
the government of checking out false positives can also be much higher
29. There are important and complex arguments about the desirability and
possible limits on the usefulness of CBA. See, e.g., Frank Ackerman & Liza
Heinzerling, Pricing the Priceless: Cost-Benefit Analysis of Environmental Protection, 150
U. PA. L. Rtv. 1553 (2002). The position I advocate here, however, avoids the bulk
of the criticisms, because the emphasis is on a logical, qualitative analysis instead of
a process that emphasizes quantification of difficult-to-measure outcomes.
30. See Torsten Ove, Thief May Get a Charge Out of This, PITTSBURGH POsT-GA-
ZErE (May 7, 2004), available at http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/04128/
312606.stm (describing how one thief was caught while making "out of pattern"
purchase).
31. Bruce Schneier has written a similar analysis of data mining for terrorism.
Bruce Schneier, Why Data Mining Won't Stop Terror, WIRED (Mar. 9, 2006), http://
www.wired.com/news/columns/0,70357-0.html.
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than the simple phone call to the credit card customer. Each lead may
require trained investigators to do a substantial investigation of a person
who may be a dangerous terrorist. The investigation should be done in a
way that does not cause the terrorist to flee.
The analysis here does not conclude that data mining is necessarily
helpful or unhelpful in fighting terrorism. 32 Instead, the analysis is de-
signed to be an example of qualitative cost/benefit analysis. In what cir-
cumstances will data mining most likely spot useful patterns? In what
circumstances will the costs of false positives outweigh the benefits of iden-
tifying potential suspects? These sorts of inquiries will help ensure that
proposed programs are effective, and cost-effective, in fighting terrorism.
C. Is the Program "Security Theater"? How Much Does It Provide the
Appearance of Security?
A related way to test a proposal's usefulness is to use the colorful term
coined by Bruce Schneier-"security theater." As Schneier says in his
book Beyond Fear, "some countermeasures provide the feeling of security
instead of the reality." 33 In more neutral language, the question is the
extent to which a measure provides actual security versus the appearance
of security.
To understand the concept, imagine that you are an advisor to the
Secretary of Homeland Security. A meeting has been called to protect
"X," where X can be any possible target of a terrorist attack, such as an
office building, a major port or the southern border of the United States.
The Secretary is going to testify before Congress shortly on the topic. Sup-
pose that you have analyzed five proposed security measures, and decided
that none of them is effective at preventing an attack and all are costly to
implement. At the meeting, you are asked to recommend what to do.
One possibility is that the Secretary could appear before Congress and say:
"We have looked at all the options, and decided that there are no security
measures that are cost-effective, so we are going to do nothing at all."
How will this approach play with Congress and the press? In my expe-
rience, not well at all. There is a great temptation to show that one is
"doing something" and to describe concrete measures being taken in an
area. In assessing a proposed information sharing or other security mea-
sure, it is thus useful to specifically analyze the extent to which a measure
creates security or the appearance of security.
Although Schneier does not make the distinction explicit, there ap-
pears to be at least two components to security theater. The first is the
32. For an especially rigorous and well-researched defense of data mining for
homeland security purposes, see K.A. Taipale, Data Mining and Domestic Security:
Connecting the Dots to Make Sense of Data, 5 COLUM. Sci. & TEC-I. L. REv. 2, 67-72
(2003).
33. BRUCE SCHNEIER, BEYOND FEAR: THINKING SENSIBLY ABOUT SECURITY IN AN
UNCERTAIN WORLD 38 (2003) (emphasis omitted).
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possibility that the appearance of security is itself a reasonable goal. For
instance, Schneier mentions that, in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, "the
U.S. government posted armed National Guard troops at airport check-
points... (but were smart enough not to give them bullets). 34 It seems
to me quite possible that such a measure was beneficial in establishing
calm and promoting trust in air travel immediately after the attacks. In
such instances, a moderate amount of theater may produce a moderate
amount of good, in restoring calm and confidence.
A second component of security theater, however, is where a measure
is implemented primarily due to bureaucratic or political pressures to "do
something" about security. One example may be a security measure that
spread among office buildings in U.S. cities after the 9/11 attacks. People
who visited the office buildings were asked by a guard to show I.D. before
entering. In my view, it is hard to see how this ritual improved security at
all. 35 Anyone planning a significant attack would simply show an authen-
tic (or fake) I.D. on his or her way into the building. Yet building manag-
ers seem to have wanted to show they were "doing something" to increase
security.
In short, analysis of a proposed information sharing or other security
proposal should consider the possibility that the proposal is security thea-
ter rather than a measure that will actually deter or respond to an attack.
At the very least, this analytic step is important for security planners, to
make sure that the defenders are not themselves fooled by theatrics into
thinking effective security is in place if it is not.
D. Identify the Novel Nature of Proposed Surveillance and Sharing
A next part of due diligence is to consider the novel aspects of a pro-
posed program and consider whether the innovation is justified. This con-
servative intuition is associated with the name of Edmund Burke, who
criticized many innovations of the French Revolution for their radical na-
ture and unintended consequences. 3 6 An eloquent summary of Burkean
conservatism comes from supply-side economistJude Wanniski: "[S]ociety
is a vast and complicated historical product which may not be tinkered
with at will like a machine; it is a repository of collective human wisdom to
be regarded with reverence, and if reformed at all it must be with due
respect for the continuity of its traditions."37 In the words of philosopher
and economist Friedrich Hayek, "the result of the experimentation of
34. Id.
35. Kim Taipale has suggested that additional layers of security, even when
weak, may be useful because they raise the costs to terrorists of learning about the
defenses and "provide additional points of potential error on the part of the ter-
rorist that may lead to discovery." See Taipale, supra note 32, at n.285.
36. See generally EDMUND BURKE, REFLECTIONS ON THE REVOLUTION IN FRANcE
(Anchor Books 1973) (1790).
37. SeeJude Wanniski, Edmund Burke's Conservatism, POLYCONOMICS (June 19,
1998), http://www.polyconomics.com/searchbase/06-19-98.html.
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many generations may embody more experience than any one man
possesses."
38
At a common-sense level, the Burkean point suggests the usefulness of
considering possible advantages of the status quo and possible disadvan-
tages of a new program. There may be good reasons that practices and
institutions have historically developed in a certain way. There may be
unintended consequences of a well-intentioned reform. Enthusiasm for
the new proposal should be accompanied by thoughtfulness about
whether things will work out as proponents imagine.
Two current examples suggest the usefulness of the Burkean point.
The first example concerns the controversy about whether library records
should be available to the government under Section 215 of the Patriot
Act.3 9 Proponents of government access do not wish to give terrorists a
safe haven in libraries to communicate online. Opponents, on the other
hand, stress how much government access to library records differs from
historical practice, where stricter-than-usual rules have limited govern-
ment access to the reading habits of individuals. 40 The Burkean point is
that there may be good reasons why states historically have enacted special
privacy laws for library records. Any proposed change should consider this
special historical experience.
4 1
A second example does not involve information sharing but instead a
related debate in the fight against terrorism: whether the time has come
for the United States to have a national I.D. card. The Real ID Act of
2005, with its requirement of national standards for drivers' licenses, is a
significant step toward having such a card.42 Without trying to debate all
of the issues about a national I.D. system,4 3 the Burkean point is a simple
one. The longstanding tradition of avoiding a national I.D. card is itself a
reason for caution in moving forward. There are quite possibly important
reasons why use of the identity card has been eschewed in the many emer-
38. F. A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 62 (1960).
39. For a further discussion of Section 215 and library records, see Swire,
supra note 19, at 1331-32, 1356-59. The provisions concerning searches of library
records were somewhat modified in the 2006 reauthorization of the Patriot Act.
40. See Kathryn Martin, Note, The USA Patriot Act's Application to Library Patron
Records, 29 J. LEGIs. 283, 295 (2003).
41. I have made a similar argument against the "gag rule" in Sections 215 and
505 of the Patriot Act. These rules prohibit individuals who have received certain
orders to produce documents to disclose the fact of the search. One argument
against the gag rules is how much they differ from historical practice for physical
searches. See Swire, supra note 19, at 1359-60.
42. The Real ID Act was passed as Division B of an Act Making Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, the Global War on Terror, and Tsu-
nami Relief, for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2005, and for Other Pur-
poses, Pub. L. No. 109-13, 119 Stat. 231 (2005).
43. A recent report from the National Academy of Sciences examines the
many technical and institutional obstacles to effective implementation of a na-
tional I.D. card. NAT'L AcAD. OF SCIS., COMPUTER SCI. AND TECH. BD., IDs-NOT
THAT EASY: QUESTIONS ABOUT NATIONAL IDENTITY SYSTEMS (2002).
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gencies that have faced the United States since its founding. Enthusiasm
for possible advantages of an identity card should be tempered by consid-
eration of why it has not been adopted previously.
How is one to apply the Burkean point in assessing a proposed secur-
ity program? To begin with, the status quo should not be exalted as some
ideal state. Burke himself wrote: "A state without the means of some
change is without the means of its conservation. '44 The Burkean point
instead is a useful corrective to the tendency to believe that "everything
has changed" since 9/11. 4 5 Many things have changed since those attacks,
but many things have not. As a step in the due diligence for proposed
programs, it is useful to identify the novel aspects of a proposed program,
consider possible unintended consequences, and then move forward if,
and only if, the case for the new program is convincing.
E. Consider Historical Abuses and Implement Checks and Balances
The history of government surveillance is linked with a history of gov-
ernment abuse. The Framers of the United States Constitution reacted to
the problem of general warrants with the Fourth Amendment, which be-
gins by stating: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated." 46 By including "papers and effects," the text under-
scores the importance of protecting people's communications and records
from unreasonable government searches. Such communications and
records are often the subject of information sharing proposals. Even
where changing practices mean that the Fourth Amendment does not lit-
erally apply,4 7 the principle of preventing abuse of government power
nonetheless remains important. Part of due diligence for assessing infor-
mation sharing programs, therefore, is an assessment of historical patterns
of abuse and the corresponding need to create checks and balances
against such problems.
The policy of prevention carries with it particular risks of abuse.
Since September 11, FBI Director Mueller has announced that prevention
of terror attacks is the top priority of the agency.48 In making prevention
the priority, the Bureau is returning to the heavy emphasis on prevention
44. See BURKE, supra note 36, at 33.
45. I have elsewhere critiqued the view that "everything has changed" since
September 11. See Swire, supra note 19, at 1342-48.
46. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
47. For two excellent analyses of gaps in statutory and Fourth Amendment
protections for online activity, see Patricia L. Bellia, Surveillance Law Through
Cyberlaw's Lens, 72 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 1375, 1380 (2004); Deirdre K_ Mulligan,
Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A Critical Perspective on the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1557, 1582-96 (2004).
48. See David Johnson, 9/11 Congressional Report Faults FBL-C.LA. Lapses, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 2003, at Al 2.
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adopted by DirectorJ. Edgar Hoover in the fight against Communists and
other "subversives."
A detailed history of FBI activities from the Hoover period comes
from the 1976 "Church Committee" Report, named for Senator Frank
Church. 49 According to this report, after World War II, "preventive intelli-
gence about 'potential' espionage or sabotage involved investigations
based on political affiliations and group membership and association.
The relationship to law enforcement was often remote and specula-
tive . -50 Until the Church Committee's hearings, the FBI continued to
collect domestic intelligence under "sweeping authorizations" for investi-
gations of "'subversives,' potential civil disturbances, and 'potential
crimes.'"51 Based on its study of the history, the Church Committee
concluded:
The tendency of intelligence activities to expand beyond their
initial scope is a theme which runs through every aspect of our
investigative findings. Intelligence collection programs naturally
generate ever-increasing demands for new data. And once intel-
ligence has been collected, there are strong pressures to use it
against the target.52
In addition to this tendency of prevention to lead to expanding sur-
veillance and information sharing, my previous writings have identified
other concerns raised in earlier eras of expanded surveillance in the
United States. These other concerns include: routine violations of law;
secrecy; use against political opponents; targeting and disruption of un-
popular groups; chilling of First Amendment rights; harm to individuals;
distortion of data to influence government policy and public perceptions;
and cost and ineffectiveness. 53
What are we to make of these experiences as we consider new infor-
mation sharing projects? One answer comes from a longtime civil servant
who has participated in information sharing projects in recent years: "We
49. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO IN-
TELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES, 94TH CONG., FINAL REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AND
THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, BOOK II, § I (1976) (internal citations omitted) [herein-
after CHURCH FINAL REP. IN'], available at http://www.icdc.com/~paulwolf/
coin telpro/churchfinalreportlIa.htm.
50. SELECT COMM. TO STUDY GOVERNMENTAL OPERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO IN-
TELLIGENCE ACTirrwis, 9TH CONG., FINAL REPORT ON INTELLIGENCE ACTMTIES AND
THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS, BOOK II, § II, U.S. Senate, Apr. 26, 1976 (footnotes
omitted), available at http://www.icdc.com/-paulwolf/cointelpro/churchfinalre-
portllb.htrm.
51. Id.
52. CHURCH FINAL REP. IIA, supra note 49.
53. See Swire, supra note 19, at 1315-20. Paul Rosenzweig, now an official in
the Department of Homeland Security, has written a thoughtful article that em-
phasizes the greater checks against abuse that exist today than in previous periods.
See Paul Rosenzweig, Civil Liberties and the Response to Terrorism, 42 DuQ. L. REv. 663,
671-74 (2004).
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don't need a new law. We need a ninth grade history teacher."54 Knowl-
edge of history reduces the likelihood that we will repeat it. Until recent
years, federal agency meetings often included veterans of the Church
Committee era, and these veterans often had vivid personal memories of
the problems the agencies faced when excessive surveillance was uncov-
ered. 55 Today, however, many of those veterans have retired. Education
in the history of abuses is thus one sensible step for those who are assess-
ing new information sharing and other surveillance programs.
The due diligence, I believe, begins with knowledge of the history.
The second step is to consider what checks and balances are in place
against possible future abuse. I am not a pessimist who believes that intel-
ligence activities inevitably will return to the level of problems seen in ear-
lier periods. I do believe, however, that human nature has remained
largely unchanged since then. Unless effective institutional safeguards ex-
ist, large and sustained expansions of domestic intelligence activity, in the
name of national security, can quite possibly recreate the troublesome be-
haviors of the past.
F. Do Fairness and Anti-Discrimination Concerns Reduce the Desirability of the
Proposed Program?
A next lens for examining a proposed information sharing program
concerns racial and ethnic profiling. The due diligence here concerns the
fairness and efficacy of such profiling.
The case for profiling was made in a particularly blunt way by Neil
Livingstone, CEO of the international security firm GlobalOptions:
"Young Islamic males, like it or not, are the enemy. There is no getting
around it, we have to profile them."56 Some leading criminal justice schol-
ars have given at least qualified support to ethnic profiling.5 7 Information
collection and sharing projects thus may target "young Islamic males" or
other groups that are thought to be especially likely to pose security risks.
In response, former prosecutor and now Ohio State law professor
Sharon Davies has written a closely-reasoned and persuasive article on
"Profiling Terror."58 Professor Davies summarizes potential harmful ef-
fects of explicit racial targeting:
54. The civil servant who made this remark to me asked not to have it attrib-
uted to him.
55. During my own federal service in 1999 until early 2001, I heard such state-
ments from veterans of the Church Committee era.
56. Wendy Ruderman, Arab-Americans Upset by Profiling, BERGEN REc., Sept. 23,
2001, at Al.
57. See, e.g., Samuel R. Gross & Debra Livingston, Racial Profiling Under Attack,
102 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1437 (2002); William J. Stuntz, Local Policing After the
Terror, 111 YALE LJ. 2137, 2161 (2002).
58. See generally Sharon L. Davies, Profiling Terror, 1 OHIO ST. J. CRiM. L. 45
(2003). Davies's work builds on excellent earlier scholarship by David Harris. See
David A. Harris, The Stories, the Statistics, and the Law: Why "Driving While Black"
Matters, 84 MINN. L. REv. 265 (1999).
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It takes a profound emotional toll on those subject to it. It is
degrading and intimidating. It also has serious group effects. It
treats innocent, law-abiding people like criminals purely on the
basis of race or ethnicity. It encourages [those targeted by profil-
ing] to be mistrustful of and to avoid contact with the police, and
heightens racial tensions when those contacts occur. It solidifies
racial divides and racial prejudices, as Whites equate greater
Black arrests with greater Black criminality. And it is fundamen-
tally inconsistent with equality principles supposedly at the center
of our political and social system. 59
Due diligence on ethnic profiling would seem to include at least three
components. First, ethnic profiling by government can be unfair and per-
ceived as unfair. To what extent does a proposed program violate legal
and ethical principles of equality, and can steps be taken to reduce ine-
quality or mitigate its effects?
Second, Davies's article provides a series of reasons to doubt the em-
pirical case for the usefulness of ethnic profiling. She states: "In a nation
that claims upwards of 3.5 million persons of Arab ancestry, the ethnic
characteristic of Arab descent, standing alone, possesses no useful predic-
tive power for separating the September 11 terrorists' accomplices and
other terrorist wannabees from innocent Americans." 60 Davies surveys the
history of racial and ethnic profiling, including an empirical study that
showed that black drivers were stopped more often while driving on an
interstate highway in Maryland but actually had contraband at a lower rate
than white drivers. 6 1 In terms of terrorism, Davies points out that the
Oklahoma City and Unabomber attacks were done by white males from
upstate New York, yet there have been no profiling proposals of that
group.62 Davies concludes: "In light of the human tendency to overesti-
mate the value of racial and ethnic proof, a presumption against its consid-
eration is appropriate."63 Even if one does not agree with a strong
presumption against profiling, the history of over-reliance on profiling is
itself a good reason to proceed cautiously with new profiling proposals.
Third, ethnic profiling can undercut cooperation from the commu-
nity that is targeted. 64 Suppose you were a member of a community that is
59. Davies, supra note 58, at 73-74 (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 52.
61. See id. at n.56 (collecting several similar study results).
62. See id. at 78-79 (documenting attacks of several American-born terrorists).
I myself grew up in upstate New York, and would not welcome profiling on that
basis.
63. Id. at 75.
64. But see, e.g., EUROPEAN MONITORING CENTRE ON RACISM AND XENOPHOBIA,
THE IMPACT OF 7 JULY 2005 LONDON BOMB ATTACKS ON MUSLIM COMMUNITIES IN
THE EU 21-23 (2005), available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/l/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/
10 11_05_attacks report.pdf (discussing new measures taken by authorities after
July 2005 bombing on London underground to try to increase cooperation with
local Muslim community).
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seen by some as a source of danger to other groups in society, such as
black neighborhoods during the riots in the 1960s or Arab American com-
munities today. For the police, an important question is whether profiling
produces more information about crimes (by catching more possible
criminals) or less information (by alienating the targeted community and
drying up sources of leads). I am not aware of any general theory that
determines when harsh measures, including those based on race and
ethnicity, become counter-productive. To the extent cooperation with the
government is needed to prevent crime and terrorist attacks, then it is
important to consider the possibility that profiling measures will reduce
that cooperation.
G. Are There Ways the Proposed Measure Could Make
Security Problems Worse?
One useful part of due diligence is to consider the possibility that a
proposed measure will actually make the problem worse. The discussion
of ethnic profiling raised this possibility-perhaps harsher profiling of a
community will reduce cooperation so that the authorities actually learn
less than they would have without the profiling.
As a logical matter, the possibility of a measure undercutting itself is
part of an earlier item on the due diligence list, whether the proposal is
effective and cost-effective at promoting security. As a matter of perform-
ing due diligence, however, I suggest that the possibility of a measure un-
dercutting itself is a useful tool of a devil's advocate. By focusing one's
attention on the possibility of a self-defeating consequence, one is some-
times able to spot a problem that would otherwise have been overlooked.
One example has been raised by Bruce Schneier and earlier research-
ers in connection with proposed "trusted traveler" programs. 65 Such pro-
grams would do background checks of air passengers who volunteer for
them. Passengers who pass the background check get access to faster
lanes at airport security and are exempt from secondary screening. This
sort of program could understandably be attractive to frequent flyers, who
otherwise stand in the standard, longer security lines.
Schneier critiques the program in this way: "Imagine you're a terrorist
plotter with half a dozen potential terrorists at your disposal. They all ap-
ply for a card, and three get one. Guess which three are going on the
mission? And they'll buy round-trip tickets with credit cards, and have a
65. For one official document supporting a trusted traveler program, see
Press Release, Office of the Press Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., United States,
Mexico and Canada Deliver Initial Security and Prosperity Partnership Report
(June 27, 2005), http://www.dhs.gov/dhspublic/display?content=4552. For im-
portant earlier research on how terrorists will adapt to a trusted traveler program,
see Samidh Chakrabarti & Aaron Strauss, Carnival Booth: An Algorithm for Defeating
the Computer-Assisted Passenger Screening System (2002), available at http://www.
swiss.ai.mit.edu/6805/student-papers/springO2-papers/caps.htm.
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'normal' amount of luggage with them."6 6 A program designed to en-
hance security can thus undermine security by creating a clear path to the
airplane for the terrorists who pass the background check.
Another example comes from a visit I made to Europe in the fall of
2005, when the European Union was considering a data retention propo-
sal, which was later adopted.6 7 The program requires telephone compa-
nies and Internet service providers (ISPs) to retain records of phone calls,
emails and web surfing for six months or more. At the time of the confer-
ence, there were contentious arguments about the proposal, focusing
mostly on the privacy risks that come from storing all the communication
records.
I was giving an earlier version of this Article at the conference, and so
I applied the "does the proposal undermine security" question to the data
retention plan. A new insight quickly emerged. The data retention pro-
posal creates a risk to police forces and intelligence agencies whose own
communications records now would be stored by telephone companies
and ISPs.68 Terrorists and criminals who could infiltrate the ISPs could
now get insights into police and intelligence activities. 69 The proposed
security measure of data retention thus created a new security
vulnerability.
Note that discovery of such a vulnerability does not indicate what ac-
tion to take. For some, discovery of the vulnerability might tilt the risk/
benefit calculus, and lead to opposition to the data retention proposal.
For others, the data retention measure may still seem worthwhile, but now
measures should be considered to address the vulnerability. In either
case, the devil's advocate analysis was useful. By asking the question of
whether a security measure undermined security, certain risks of the pro-
gram became apparent that had not previously surfaced in public debate.
66. Bruce Schneier, Trusted Traveler Program, CRYro-GRAM NEWSLET-rER, Sept.
15, 2004, http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram-0409.html#5.
67. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil on the Retention of Data Processed in Connection with the Provision of Public Electronic
Communication Services and Amending Directive 2002/58/EC, at 6, COM (2005) 438
final (Sept. 21, 2005), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/lex/LexUriServ/
site/en/com/2005/com2005_0438en01.pdf.
68. Prior to the data retention proposals, European privacy laws generally
prohibited storage of communications records beyond the period needed for bill-
ing purposes. See Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council
2002 O.J. (L 201) 37, 40 (EU), available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/.
oj/dat/2002/l201/1_20120020731 en00370047.pdf.
69. A related risk came from the provision that gave access to the communica-
tions records to the police and, perhaps even worse, to terrorists and criminals who
could get assistance from officials in any of the twenty-five E.U. Member States
could get access to the records under accelerated procedures. See Commission Pro-
posal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Retention of Data
Processed in Connection with the Provision of Public Electronic Communication Services and
Amending Directive 2002/58/EC, supra note 67, at 6.
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H. What Are the Ramifications Internationally and with Other Stakeholders?
The implicit focus thus far has been on the effects of an information
sharing proposal on security for the United States. The next step in due
diligence is to consider effects on other countries and on other possible
stakeholders.
A prominent example since 9/11 has been the dispute between the
U.S. and the European Union over U.S. access to passenger name records
("PNRs") for flights into and out of the United States.70 The United
States has sought electronic access to information about passengers in-
cluding name, address, flight number, credit card number and so on. The
European Union expressed concerns about how data would be handled
about its citizens, and about compliance with E.U. privacy laws. In 2004,
the United States issued a set of undertakings about how it will handle the
data.7 1 A key data protection committee in the E.U. has made a finding
that the program is adequate under European law,72 but legal challenges
continue within Europe.
73
Whatever the eventual outcome on PNRs, the dispute illustrates the
importance of considering international ramifications of proposed infor-
mation sharing programs. Among other possible issues, it is useful to con-
sider four. First, the program may be lawful in the United States but
violate the law in other countries. If so, then the program will likely be
significantly more difficult to implement or may fail entirely. Second, in-
ternational negotiations often take considerably longer to conclude than
agreement within the U.S. government. Realistically, programs relying on
international cooperation often demand a longer time frame. Third, U.S.
agencies should be prepared for the possibility that other countries will
expect information to be shared from the U.S. as well. It is prudent for
the U.S. to consider whether it is willing to share its information with
others, before expecting others to share with the United States. Fourth,
U.S. proponents of an information sharing program should work coopera-
tively with the State Department and other entities that are knowledgeable
70. A detailed set of sources about the PNR debate is at http://www.epic.org/
privacy/intl/passengerdata.html.
71. See Dep't of Homeland Sec., Undertakings of the Department of Home-
land Security Bureau of Customs and Border Protection (CBP) (May 11, 2004),
http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/CBP-DHS PNRUndertakings5-25-04.
pdf.
72. See Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 8/2004 on the In-
formation for Passengers Concerning the Transfer of PNR Data on Flights Be-
tween the European Union and the United States of America (Sept. 30, 2004),
available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/justice-home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/
2004/wp97_en.pdf.
73. In November, 2005, the Advocate General of the European Court of Jus-
tice advised that court to annul the PNR agreement on the grounds that the indi-
vidual countries, rather than the E.U. itself, were the proper entities to negotiate
such an agreement. See European Digital Rights, Advocate General European
Court Rejects PNR Deal (Dec. 5, 2005), http://www.edri.org/edrigram/num-
ber3.24/PNR (linking to related documents).
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about the diplomatic ramifications of a proposed program. An architec-
ture that makes sense from a U.S. perspective may ruffle feathers
overseas. 
74
Information sharing programs for U.S. national security are often
conceived within a few agencies of the federal government. Increasingly,
information sharing programs are contemplated internationally, or with
states, localities and other organizations within the United States. Federal
agencies have a limited ability to dictate to outside entities how informa-
tion sharing should occur. Part of the due diligence for a new program,
therefore, should be a thoughtful assessment of how these outside stake-
holders may react. This assessment may lead to modification of how the
information sharing program should proceed. In some instances, the le-
gal and other concerns of outside entities will be severe enough that the
program is not worth pursuing.
I. Are There Privacy-Based Harms from the Proposed Measure?
The next item in the due diligence list is an explicit examination of
privacy-based harms that might result from a proposed measure. The dis-
cussion here first explains why the term "privacy" is not prominent earlier
in the due diligence list, and then turns to the privacy-based harms.
1. Why the Term "Privacy" Is Not Prominent in the Due Diligence List
The discerning reader may have noticed an odd thing about the dis-
cussion thus far-in an article entitled Privacy and Information Sharing in
the War on Terrorism, there have been only three passing references to pri-
vacy in the first eight items of the due diligence list.
In part, the lack of discussion of privacy is due to the vagueness of the
term. The word privacy is used to cover a multitude of more specific con-
cerns.75 In creating a due diligence list, it thus works better analytically to
refer to those concerns individually. For instance, it is a standard part of
privacy discussions to refer to historical abuses and the need for checks
and balances.
In greater measure, though, the downplaying of the term privacy re-
flects my pragmatic experience in assessing proposed information systems,
both from outside government and from my time as Chief Counselor for
74. Another international area of dispute has flared up in British Columbia,
where a major agency report has sought to prevent personal data of its citizens
from being held in the United States and subjected to the USA-Patriot Act. See
Information & Privacy Commissioner for British Columbia, Privacy and the USA-
PATRIOT Act: Implications for British Columbia Public Sector Outsourcing (Oct.
2004), available at http://www.oipcbc.org/sector-public/usa-patriot-act/pdfs/re-
port/privacy-final.pdf.
75. My views here are similar to those of Dan Solove, who uses Wittgenstein's
idea of "family resemblance" to describe the multiple, related meanings of the
word "privacy." See Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CAL. L. REv. 1087,
1096-99 (2002) (describing that single word need not have any single meaning but
can be used to represent several interconnected ideas).
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Privacy during the Clinton administration. The due diligence list here re-
flects the questions I have found useful in working with those who propose
or evaluate new information systems. Typically, some people in the pro-
cess believe strongly in privacy, and are thus inclined to mold systems in
privacy-protective ways. Others, however, have different views. The due
diligence list shows the additional arguments that sometimes give such
persons pause. Rigorous use of the due diligence list may create opportu-
nities for fine-tuning a proposal or, occasionally, for making the decision
that a program is not worth pursuing.
The due diligence list is designed to help decision makers avoid a
rhetorical trap that often arises in privacy discussions. Discussions too
often fall into the need to "balance" security and privacy, or find the right
"trade-off" between the two. My experience is that constructive analysis
typically ends the moment that talk turns to balancing or trade-off. After
September 11 (and even before), the meeting ends this way: "You might
make a good point, and I believe in privacy as much as the next person,
but the current security challenges mean that we will all have to give up a
little bit of our privacy." Put another way, security arguments seem tough
and realistic, while privacy arguments seem soft and idealistic. When it
comes to protecting the nation, tough and realistic will win pretty much
every time.
Perhaps the reader, looking at this discussion, might decide that the
entire due diligence list is just an effort at "spin," at finding palatable ways
to sneak privacy concerns into security discussions. I offer a different per-
spective. The due diligence list is useful in practice because it focuses at-
tention on the issues that are actually important and persuasive. If an
information sharing proposal tips off our adversaries more than it helps
us, then we should not do it. If a security proposal uses unprecedented
measures that differ greatly from historical practice, there may be major
unintended consequences, and those negative consequences should be
avoided if possible. And so on for the other items on the due diligence
list.
2. Privacy-Based Harms
To assist in due diligence on privacy-based harms, the discussion here
looks at federal agency Privacy Impact Assessments (PIAs), a Department
of Homeland Security Advisory Committee document that provides a
framework for privacy analysis and some material from my own writings.
In 2000, the Federal Chief Information Officers Council adopted the
idea of doing a PIA as a best practice for new federal agency IT systems.7 6
76. See generally FED. CHIEF INFO. OFFICER'S COUNCIL, BEST PRACTICES: PRIVACY,
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE MODEL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PRIVACY IMPACT As-
SESSMENT (2000), available at http://www.cio.gov/archive/pia_for_it irs model.
pdf (adopting Privacy Impact Assessment of Internal Revenue Service as best prac-
tice to be adapted to other administrative agencies).
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The E-Government Act of 2002 made a PIA a required step in the develop-
ment or procuring of IT systems that include personally identifiable infor-
mation.77 Under the guidance for PIAs issued by the Office of
Management and Budget, PIAs must analyze and describe:
1. what information is to be collected (e.g., nature and source);
2. why the information is being collected (e.g., to determine
eligibility);
3. intended use of the information (e.g., to verify existing data);
4. with whom the information will be shared (e.g., another
agency for a specified programmatic purpose);
5. what opportunities individuals have to decline to provide in-
formation (i.e., where providing information is voluntary) or
to consent to particular uses of the information (other than
required or authorized uses), and how individuals can grant
consent;
6. how the information will be secured (e.g., administrative and
technological controls); and
7. whether a system of records is being created under the Pri-
vacy Act, 5 U.S.C. [§] 552a. 78
In addition, the guidance is supposed to "ensure that a privacy impact
assessment is commensurate with the size of the information system being
assessed, the sensitivity of information that is in an identifiable form in
that system, and the risk of harm from unauthorized release of that infor-
mation."79 In essence, the PIA requires the agency to map the informa-
tion flows of data into, through and out of a federal IT system and to
determine the risk of harm from such data flows.
The Department of Homeland Security Data Privacy and Integrity Ad-
visory Committee has recently adopted a thoughtful document entitled
Framework for Privacy Analysis of Programs, Technologies, and Applications
("Framework"). 80 The Framework overall takes an approach similar to the
due diligence approach put forward in this Article. In its section of pri-
vacy and related interests, the Framework asks a series of structured ques-
tions. In summary, the questions address the following:
77. See E-Government Act of 2002 § 208, 44 U.S.C. Ch. 36.
78. Memorandum from Joshua B. Bolten, Dir. of the Office of Mgmt. and
Budget, OMB Guidance for Implementing the Privacy Provisions of the E-Govern-
ment Act of 2002, attachment A, pt. (II) (C) (1) (a) (Sept. 26, 2003), http://www.
whitehouse.gov/omb/memoranda/m03-22.html (citation omitted).
79. Id. attachment B, pt. (B) (2) (b) (i).
80. See DATA PRIVACY AND INTEGRITY ADVISORY COMM., DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SEC., REP. No. 2006-1, FRAMEWORK FOR PRIVACY ANALYSIS OF PROGRAMS, TECHNOLO-
GIES, AND APPLICATIONS 1 (2006) available at http://www.privacilla.org/releases/
DHSPrivacyFramework.pdf (establishing framework within which to analyze se-
curity of technological applications and programs).
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* Confidentiality. What rules and practices assure confidentiality
of information?
" Anonymity. Is anonymity retained where that is reasonably
possible?
" Seclusion. If the program fosters surveillance, are minimiza-
tion practices in place, such as collection limitation, purpose
specification, use limitation and retention limitation?
* Fairness. Are fairness and due process promoted, by compli-
ance with criteria such as data quality, notice, individual par-
ticipation and accountability, and transparency and
accountability?
* Liberty. Does the program limit individual freedom, such as
by conditioning freedom of movement or diminution of some
privacy interest?
* Data security. How is personal information secured against
threats to privacy and integrity?8 '
Along with these official documents, my earlier writings have at-
tempted to analyze the sorts of harms that can result from surveillance. In
Financial Privacy and the Theory of High-Tech Government Surveillance, I ex-
amined the sorts of harms that might occur if the government had routine
access to every purchase made by individuals.8 2 Types of harms notably
include chilling effects (we might not act the same way if we are on cam-
era), the burdens from complying with the surveillance (such as the time
spent standing in long security lines in airports) and the privacy invasions
themselves (ranging from identity theft to a non-tangible sense of inva-
sion).8 3 That article includes a detailed listing of possible privacy inva-
sions.84 One major but difficult to measure harm results from the privacy
paradox: some surveillance measures are acceptable in the short term, but
a long-term shift toward pervasive surveillance would be seen far more
negatively. 85
In short, by drawing on sources such as the E-Government Act of
2002, the Framework and scholarly writings, detailed due diligence is pos-
sible on the explicitly privacy-related harms that can arise from new infor-
mation collection and sharing programs.
J. Will Bad Publicity Undermine the Program?
One last item for the due diligence list is to consider the possibility
that the proposal will receive bad publicity once its existence becomes
81. Id. at 4-6.
82. See generally Peter P. Swire, Financial Privacy and the Theory of High-Tech Gov-
ernment Surveillance, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 461 (1999) (describing disadvantages of gov-
ernment access to private information).
83. See id. at 472.
84. See id. at 493-507.
85. See id. at 461; Swire, supra note 19, at 1350.
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known. There is an oft-repeated cycle where the government proposes a
new program, privacy flaws are detected and immediate controversy swirls
around the project. Among many examples might be numbered the can-
cellation or rollback of Total Information Awareness, 86 the CAPPS II pas-
senger profiling program8 7 and the Federal Intrusion Detection Network
(FIDNet).88 Indeed, during my time in government, one way I would get
busy officials to focus on privacy issues was simply to give them recent
press clips of government programs that had been canceled due to a pri-
vacy outcry in the press. 89
It is useful to be specific about the way that bad publicity rationally fits
within the due diligence process. First, sometimes bad publicity is an accu-
rate reflection of problems with the proposed program-the program
might look bad in the press because it is a bad idea, or because critics can
accurately describe flaws. The task of preparing to discuss the program
with the public may thus force proponents to confront a program's
weaknesses.
Next, sometimes a program may seem worse in the press than it actu-
ally is. A complex program may be difficult to explain clearly, or sensa-
tionalistic anecdotes might be used by opponents. In addition, there may
be a top secret basis for the program that cannot be disclosed. Even in
such circumstances, I suggest, the possibility of negative press should be
considered in advance. In a democracy, government programs will gener-
ally succeed over time only if they have public support. Considering how a
program will look to the public thus is one step in the process of deciding
whether and how to go forward with a program. In bureaucratic terms, it
is often useful to vet a program with the press office and privacy experts
before announcing the program. If those experts clear the program, it is
86. A detailed set of links about the Total Information Awareness program is
available at Electronic Privacy Information Center, "Terrorism" Information
Awareness (TIA), http://www.epic.org/privacy/profiling/tia (last visited May 10,
2006).
87. The original CAPPS II program was canceled and replaced with the less-
ambitious Secure Flight program, which itself has received continuing criticism. A
detailed set of links about the history is available at Electronic Privacy Information
Center, Secure Flight, http://www.epic.org/privacy/airtravel/secureflight.html
(last visited May 10, 2006).
88. See John Markoff, U.S. Drawing Plan That Will Monitor Computer Systems,
N.Y. TIMES, July 28, 1999, at Al. By the next year, the front-page criticisms had
turned into an uncontroversial program to purchase commercially-available
software. See ChristopherJ. Dorobek, GSA Kicks Off Effort for Intrusion Detection Ser-
vice, GoVT COMPUTER NEWS, June 19, 2000, available at http://www.gcn.com/
print/voll 9_noI6/2264-1.html.
89. For one discussion of the topic, focused on privacy press in the mid-1990s,
see generally LAURAJ. GURAK, PERSUASION AND PRIVACY IN CYBERSPACE: THE ONLINE
PROTESTS OVER LOTUS MARKETPLACE AND THE CLIPPER CHIP (1997) (chronicling
public debate about privacy issues, among others, surrounding launch of Lotus
MarketPlace customer information software and government Clipper encryption
technology during mid-1990s).
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more likely to survive criticism from advocacy groups, the media, the Con-
gress and the general public.
IV. CONCLUSION
The approach in this Article is intended to be practical-to gain the
benefits from new information sharing programs while minimizing the
risks to security, privacy and other goals. The due diligence checklist
emerges from my own experience in creating and critiquing new informa-
tion sharing programs. The checklist is designed to give constructive criti-
ques of proposed programs before they are set in stone.
I hope that this sort of constructive critique becomes a regular part of
the creation of new information sharing programs in the federal govern-
ment. The due diligence list may prove useful to new institutional actors,
such as the Chief Privacy Officers in federal agencies or the Privacy and
Civil Liberties Board established by the 2004 intelligence reform law. Be-
yond this internal critique, the due diligence checklist can be used by Con-
gress, the press and the general public to examine proposed programs
and spot potential concerns. As we develop more information sharing
programs, we can develop better methods for thoughtfully evaluating
them.
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